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Peter J. McCormick* The Most Dangerous Justice:
Measuring Judicial Power on the
Lamer Court 1991-97
The Suoreme Court is an important national institution, but it is also nine
individuals with differing conceptions of the law, the constitution and the judicial
role. When the Court divides, which it does about half the time, some judges tend
more often than others to write or to sign the reasons that constitute the decision
of the Court. This article explores the notion of "judicial power" by looking at the
way that judges have written opinions and signed on to the opinions of others for
the first seven years of this decade, looking for the "most powerful"
(melodramatically: the "most dangerous") justice. It concludes by speculating
about the implications of Justice La Forest's retirement and Justice Sopinka's
death.
La Cour supr6me du Canada est non seulement une importante institution
nationale, mais c'est aussi neuf individus qui ont chacun leur propre conception
du droit, de la constitution et du r6le judiciaire. Lorsque la Courestdivisee, comme
c'est souvent le cas, certains juges ont tendance j 6crire ou a signer plus
fr6quemment que leurs collegues, les motifs qui constituent la decision de la
Cour. Cet article traite de la notion du "pouvoirjudiciaire" en examinant la fagon
dont les juges ont redige leurs motifs et ont appuye les positions des autres au
cours des premiers sept ans de cette decennie, dans le but d'identifier le juge le
plus "puissant" ( melodramatiquement: le plus "dangereux"). L 'article conclut en
speculant au sujet des implications de la retraite dujuge La Forest et de la mort
du juge Sopinka.
* Professor and Chair of Political Science, University of Lethbridge, Alberta. I wish to
acknowledge the financial assistance of the Manitoba Legal Research Institute and the Alberta
Law Foundation, which jointly funded the project which assembled this data base; and to thank
Prof. Alvin Esau of the MLRI, and Mr. Owen Snider of the ALF, for their support and
encouragement.
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Introduction
The melodramatic title of this article is, of course, a play on James
Madison's comment in the Federalist Papers about the Supreme Court
constituting the "least dangerous" of the three branches of government.'
The logic of the ranking is obvious: The legislature is dangerous because
of its capacity to tax and to regulate and to create crimes and offences-
hence H.L. Mencken's famous comment about no one's life, liberty or
property being safe while the legislature is in session. The executive is
dangerous because of its police and its soldiers and its bureaucrats, who
can command and prohibit and expropriate and investigate. Thejudiciary
has only the power of words, gossamer reins that float in the air unless
someone chooses to be led, chooses to treat them as compelling, chooses
to be bound and limited and directed. But the fact that so many political
actors so often make this choice means that the least dangerous branch
can still be dangerous; from which it follows that it is worth finding out
which of the judges on the highest court is the most powerful, and hence
the most dangerous member of the least dangerous branch.
The title also has the advantage of invoking similar attempts in the U.S.
literature to assess the relative power of the various members of their
Supreme Court.2 Later in this paper, I will use variants of their
methodologies to draw some conclusions from the voting and writing
1. Immortalized by A.M. Bickel's classic text, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
2. See, e.g., P.H. Edelman & J. Chen, "The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Mathematics" (1996) 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 63 [hereinafter "Most Dangerous Justice"];
L.A. Baker, "Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search for
the Swing Justice" (1996) 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 187; P.H. Edelman & J. Chen, "'Duel' Diligence:
Second Thoughts About the Supremes as the Sultans of Swing" (1996) 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 219
[hereinafter "Sultans of Swing"].
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patterns of the Lamer Court. (The American literature has also been
enlivened at the other end of the spectrum, namely the search for the
"most insignificant justice,"3 an inquiry which similarly involves
speculating about the indicia ofjudicial power.) The basic point is that not
all judges are equal, not all judges enjoy (or are able to create) the same
scholarship or the same capacity for leadership or the same opportunity
to exploit divisions between wings of the Court, and not alljudges cast the
s al-n IIULIU UI v ia l V UL ,Vr1 vi W MILs... ail- i -n IIUIIIUCJ. 01 r, I.aL I aI IUl ILaii 
decisions. There are "core" members and "marginal" members of every
appeal court that sits in large panels, something that is known, at least
informally, by most court-watchers.
4
What makes these reflections particularly relevant in a Canadian
context are the recent changes in the composition of the Supreme Court
of Canada, which during calendar year 1997 lost two of its longstanding
members and, as a result, acquired two new members. The first change
was occasioned by the retirement of Justice Gerard V. La Forest in the
summer of 1997. Justice La Forest was a senior member of the Court in
the early stages of its new (largely Charter-driven) prominence, an
eminent legal scholar whose works on water law and extradition continue
to be widely cited,5 and the writer of some of the Court's most striking and
controversial decisions. The most recent example, and a fitting swan
song, is Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney-General)6 on hospital
services for the deaf. The death of Justice Sopinka in the fall of 1997 is
also of great potential significance. Also a relatively senior member of the
Court, he authored a string of important decisions many of which dealt
with the rights of the accused-the most noteworthy (some might say
"most notorious") probably being R. v. Stinchcombe.7 Obviously, their
departure will make a difference to the Supreme Court-to the way that
3. See for example: D.P. Currie, "The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry"
(1983) 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 466; F.H. Easterbrook, "The Most Insignificant Justice: Further
Evidence" (1983) 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 481.
4. See, e.g., the piece entitled "Curiously cautious [U.S.S.C. Justice Sandra Day] O'Connor"
The Economist 345:8037 (4 October 1997) 38 which suggests that "Justice O'Connor has
staked out the centre on many of the great questions before the Court" which means that "in
closely contested cases, conservatives and liberals compete for her vote, since it is often the
deciding one."
5. See, e.g., V. Black & N. Richter, "Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of Academic
Authority by the Supreme Court of Canada 1985-1990" (1993) 16 Dal. L. J. 377; and
P. McCormick "Do Judges Read Books, Too?: Academic Citations by the Lamer Court 1991 -
6" (1998) 9 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 463.
6. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, La Forest J. for a unanimous court.
7. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
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it operates, the way that it divides on controversial legal issues, to who
delivers what sort of decisions in different areas of law.
But how big a difference, and what kind of a difference? Is La Forest
or Sopinka a Canadian version of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., the U.S. Supreme
Court's quintessential "swing voter" whose cautious preferences
frequently dictated the overarching direction of the Court?8 Or a Canadian
William J. Brennan Jr., in the sense of being a wily strategist who
fashioned enduring voting coalitions despite major ideological cleavages? 9
Or a Canadian Thurgood Marshall, stubbornly and passionately
championing a cause (capital punishment, affirmative action, whatever)
so relentlessly as gradually to draw the entire Court in his direction?' Or
a Canadian Rehnquist or Scalia, doggedly committed to an ideological
position, his relative influence waxing and waning as the vagaries of the
appointment process reinforce or deplete the ranks of his allies? Or a
Canadian Burger, transparently tactical in his voting so as to use to the
maximum the power his seniority gives him to write the words of the
majority opinion, or on the basis of crafty calculation to assign the writing
to someone else?"
This article is a preliminary attempt to generate meaningful answers on
such issues. The analysis will proceed down a double track: first, I will
try from several different angles to explore the notion ofjudicial power-
that is, to wonder about what we might mean when we suggest that one
judge exercises more (or less) power within the Court than another, and
8. See, e.g., J.C. Jeffries, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. (Macmillan, 1994) who introduces
Powell (at xi) as having been "the most powerful man in America" because of his "position at
the ideological centre of a divided Court."
9. See, e.g., B. Woodward & S. Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), whose work contributed greatly to-some would say
"invented"-the reputation of Brennan as the great strategist. See also S.H. Freidelbaum,
"Justice William J. Brennan Jr.: Policy Making in the Judicial Thicket" in S.C. Halpern & C.M.
Lamb, eds., The Burger Court: Political and Judicial Profiles (Champaign: University of
Illinois Press, 1991) at 122, who refers to Brennan's "remarkable record of consensus
building."
10. See, e.g., M.V. Tushnet, Making Constitutional Law: Thurgood Marshall and the
Supreme Court 1961-1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); W.J. Daniels, "Justice
Thurgood Marshall: The Race for Equal Justice" in Halpern & Lamb, eds., The Burger Court,
supra note 9. M. Mello, Against the Death Penalty: The Relentless Dissents of Justices
Brennan and Marshall (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1996).
11. See, e.g., "Sultans of Swing," supra note 2 at 221, where they talk about a "fictional
Justice Milquetoast" who "decides that he will always vote in the majority" whatever that
majority is deciding, and then add "[a]ny resemblance to a former Chief Justice of the United
States is strictly coincidental and certainly unintentional." In a similar vein, see B. Schwartz,
Decision: How the [United States] Supreme Court Decides Cases (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996) at 45ff [hereinafter Decision].
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what empirical data might inform or test such conjectures. 2 I will use
each of these approaches in turn to identify the "most dangerous" (in only
slightly less loaded terms, the "most powerful") member of the Supreme
Court of Canada. And second (unless that individual turns out to be
La Forest or Sopinka, in which case the two paths will have converged)
I will use the same methodology to characterize the participation of these
two judges in the general direction of recent Supreme Court decision-
making and thereby to assess tue potentiallsignificanceofthlcirdCparure.
More bluntly: what does judicial power look like, and how much of it did
La Forest and Sopinka have?
This discussion is built on a data base which includes all the reported 3
panel' 4 decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada during the Chief
Justiceship of Antonio Lamer. More specifically, the time period to be
considered is bounded on the one side by Lamer's ascension to the Chief
Justiceship in 1990, and on the other by the retirement of Mr. Justice
La Forest in 1997. Because there is a time lag-normally of several
months-between the oral hearing and the handing down of the decision,
it is the date of the oral hearing that will be taken as determinative. It
seems reasonable to take Lamer's appointment as the beginning of a
distinctive period in the life of the Court, not only because of the
convention by which intervals in the life of the institution are identified
by the name of the Chief Justice, but also because a string of appointments
left him as a very senior member of a very j unior court. By the same token,
12. I concede that the issue of "judicial power" is a large one, and by talking about which
judges on a panel appeal court exercise more power I have taken the easy end. The biggest part
of the issue is how much power the judiciary collectively exercises via-h-vis other powerful
institutions in our society (such as legislatures and political executives), a question which is
more pressing after the entrenchment of the Charter than before. Almost as big is the issue of
how much power the Supreme Court exercises within the judiciary as a whole, and it seems to
me that we simply beg the question by falling back on such terms as "binding precedent."
13. At one time, not all Supreme Court of Canada decisions were reported in the Supreme
Court Reports, some (but not all) of those omissions being reported in the Dominion Law
Reports. Since 1970, however, the coverage in the Supreme Court Reports is all but total; it may
still be the case that some Supreme Court decisions are not reported, but the fact of their not
being reported robs them of the impact on the course of the law that I will argue is an important
dimension of judicial influence.
14. Omitting the handful of single-judge responses to motions (such as Richter & Partners
v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 5; and Esmail v. Petro-Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 3) that
appear from time to time in the pages of the Supreme Court Reports.
15. More precisely: the statistics were collected and the analyses run on November 1, 1997.
There may well be some other decisions "in the pipe-line" at the moment of writing-I note
that in 1996, decisions in three of the cases argued in June of that year were handed down in
early November-but they will be too few in number to affect these calculations.
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it seems reasonable to think that the departure of La Forest, second in
seniority only to the Chief Justice, might potentially trigger a significant
realignment on the Court; and this possibility is obviously increased by
the subsequent death of Sopinka.
The choice of this time period is also attractive, quite fortuitously, for
the stability that the membership of the Supreme Court of Canada has
enjoyed during the seven years. This stands in surprising contrast to the
Laskin and Dickson Courts, both of which averaged almost one new
appointment every year-a turnover rate without parallel in the history of
the institution. For a time it seemed that rapid turnover and a "revolving
door" Court were the constant hallmarks of the "modern" (post-Laskin,
post-Charter) Supreme Court, but the stability of the 1990s has put the lie
to this over-hasty generalization. Only the appointment of Iacobucci in
early 1991, and Stevenson's replacement with Major in 1992, mark the
shortfall from a perfectly stable complement of nine judges sitting and
interacting for the full seven-year run-what American students of the
judiciary call a "natural court."
There were 770 reported panel decisions of the Supreme Court for
which the oral arguments were heard during the period indicated. In each
of these, the participation of each judge on the panel was coded as
delivering or as joining the unanimous decision of the Court, or the
majority decision of the Court, or the plurality decision of the Court, or
a separate concurring decision, or a dissent. 16 This coding is, by and large,
absolutely straightforward-much more so than for the United States
Supreme Court, whose opinions sometimes exhibit a byzantine complexity
that borders on self-caricature, to such an extent that it becomes a
"Herculean task" to try to determine "whether an actual majority exists
behind any proposition." 7 Even on the Supreme Court of Canada, it is
sometimes difficult in plurality decisions to determine which of the
fragments can best be taken as the closest approximation of the decision
16. Per coram (unanimous anonymous) decisions pose a special problem; under the coding
protocol adopted, all members of the Court are coded as joining and none of them as writing
the decision.
17. See S.D. Gerber & K. Park, "The Quixotic Search for Consensus on the U.S. Supreme
Court" (1997) 91 Am. Pol. S. Rev. 390 at 391.
18. As a "pure" example of this problem, albeit not one within the time period considered,
the "majority" in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 fragmented into three sets of reasons
for judgment; I take it that Dickson's reasons are best treated as the plurality decision, Beetz's
as a concurrence. More recently, RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A. G.), [ 1995] 3 S.C.R. 199
poses a comparable problem, with the four dissenting judges signing on to a single set of
reasons, but each of the five "majority" judges writing their own separate reasons.
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of the Court;' and sometimes the majority that forms behind part of the
Court's reasons differs from that supporting another part;' 9 and sometimes
ajudge will deliver a brief decision dismissing an appeal while recording
her own dissent;20 and sometimes a decision or a concurrence or a dissent
will be jointly authored by two judges, rather than written by one judge
and signed onto by one or more otherjudges. 2' In these situations, which
altogether were not sufficiently frequent to compromise the data base, the
coding problems were resolved on the basis of common sense supportable
by a closer reading of the individual texts.
I. Judicial Power: Voting and Writing
My starting point is simple-I want to think about what judicial power
would look like, and then to identify the empirical data that would allow
an objective assessment of the members of the Supreme Court in these
terms. What are the indicia in terms of which we might feel justified in
thinking of one judge as being more important-more powerful-than
another? If some of these indicators build on each other, if they amount
to looking at different sides or different dimensions of the same broader
entity, then how can they be used to construct indices of judicial power
and tentatively to rank the members of the Court? Alternatively, if some
of these ways of thinking about judicial power seem to trade off against
each other, to represent alternative strategies pursued for specific reasons
by different sets of judges, then which judges are the most typical or the
most adroit practitioners of each?
We start with the basics: the core function of a court of appellate
jurisdiction like the Supreme Court of Canada is (obviously) to decide
appeals-that is, to affirm the lower court decision that has been brought
to it by the losing party, or to accept the arguments of the appellant to
reverse the decision, or to alter its terms, or to send it back for a new trial.
The most transparent face ofjudicial power, then-and certainly the one
most obvious to appellants-is the fact that the members of an appellate
panel vote on the outcome of an appeal, and those votes combine to
generate a result-crudely, a "winner" and a "loser." Other things being
equal, an individual judge is more "powerful" to the extent that she votes
with the majority of the Court, especially on those not infrequent
occasions when the Court is divided. As a first statement: the most
19. For example: R. v. G.(S.G.), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 716.
20. For example: R. v. Osvath, [1997] I S.C.R. 7.
21. For example: R. v. Curragh Inc., [ 1997] 1 S.C.R. 537, which features both a co-authored
decision by La Forest and Cory, and a co-authored dissent by McLachlin and Major.
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powerful judges are those whose views prevail the most often, which
means (to make the same point from the obverse) those judges who
dissent the least often.
But this crude first approximation is a little too crude-a better focus
for assessing judicial power is not the vote but the reasons for judgment.
A critical feature of judicial decision making (especially at the appellate
level) is the fact that results are accompanied by discursive explanation-
by written reasons for judgment providing the principles, definitions,
analysis, clarification and sometimes the extrapolations from existing
precedent that justify the immediate outcome.2 For everyone except the
immediate parties (and sometimes even for them) the outcome is less
important than the reasons, because it is the reasons that cast their
shadows forward, both to direct the deliberations of the lower courts and
to constrain the future decisions of the deciding court. Terrell suggests
that we should think of a specific judicial decision as having not only a
notional locus on a multi-dimensional grid, but also a direction (in the
way that it builds on previous decisions) and a "spin" (in the way that it
invites certain extensions of its generalized principles and discourages
others).23 Because the tone and the detail can make a real difference, it
often matters a great deal which judge writes the reasons for judgment
even within a unanimous court; in the U.S. there is a considerable
literature on the logic of opinion assignment and the tactics whereby
individual judges can maximize their leverage.24
As a better starting point, then: it is when they deliver the reasons for
judgment for the Court that judges have the clearest and most direct
influence on the evolution of legal doctrine and the course of the law-
that is to say, the most power. The reasons contained in the majority's
reasons for judgment are the clear signpost for the lower courts, and for
the members of the bar who will argue future appeals before the Supreme
Court itself. To be sure, the specific wording of those reasons will respond
to the concerns of the other judges on the panel, who do not simply vote
22. For a discussion of the significance of this requirement, see M. Shapiro, "The Giving
Reasons Requirement" (1992) U. Chi. Legal Forum 179; and F. Schauer, "Giving Reasons"
(1995) 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633.
23. T.P. Terrell, "Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the
Development of Fundamental Normative Principles" (1984) 72 Cal. L. Rev. 288.
24. To consider only a few examples: S. Brenner & H.J. Spaeth, "Majority Opinion
Assignment and the Maintenance of the Original Coalition on the Warren Court" (1988)
32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 72; F. Maltzman & P.J. Wahlbeck, "May It Please the Chief?: Opinion
Assignments in the Rehnquist Court" (1996) 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 421; D.W. Rohde, "Policy
Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinion Assignments in the US Supreme Court" (1972)
16 Midwest J. Pol. Sci. 652; E.E. Slotnick, "Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion
Assignments from Taft to Burger" (1979) 23 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 60.
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and disappear-the process is more extended and collegial." After oral
argument, the case is discussed at conference and the responsibility of
writing tentatively assigned, but the draft judgment is then circulated for
critical comment and reply, and it can come up again at conference for
further discussion.26 Along the way, votes may change (although they
usually do not) and the writing may be reassigned to someone else
(although it normally is not). The writing judge may have to omit
arguments that she would have preferrcuto Include, o shade the wording
(sometimes by reducing rather than increasing clarity), to include caveats
or qualifications that she would not personally have chosen. As O'Brien
observes in the American context, "[i]n order to accommodate the views
of others, the author of an opinion for the Court must negotiate language
and bargain over substance.
'27
1 will explore this second dimension of power later in this paper, and
I certainly do not deny its importance, but for the moment my point is the
simpler and more obvious one: the leading signature on the published
reasons for judgment is far more than a formal flourish, because it
acknowledges the judge who had the most to say about the precise
wording of the decision as finally delivered. And therefore (other things
being equal) the most powerful judge is arguably the one who most often
writes the decisions of the Court, especially on those critical cases that
divide the Court.
Second best, but by no means insignificant, are those occasions when
a judge signs on to a decision of the Court, whether unanimous or
majority. Power in this form involves (sometimes) determining which of
several positions becomes the majority decision, (always) determining
how decisively large that majority is within the panel, and (to some
extent) influencing the wording of the majority decision. Although all
judges can read and comment on the draft of the reasons forjudgment, it
is the judges within the prevailing coalition who enjoy the greatest
leverage in fine-tuning the majority decision to more closely approximate
their own preferences. This leverage comes from the fact that they can at
any time decide to withhold their signatures from the final draft, and to
25. For a discussion of the decision-making processes of the Supreme Court of Canada, see
Bertha Wilson, "Decision-Making in the Supreme Court" (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227.
26. The circulation of written opinions, and revision in the light of critical comment, is an
important and obvious feature of appeal court decision making. Its importance is demonstrated
by the observation that in the early years of the U.S. Supreme Court, when written opinions
were not circulated after conference, "justices complained ... that the opinion read from the
bench and the final printed version differed from that agreed to in conference." see D.M.
O'Brien, Storm Centre: The Supreme Court in American Politics, 3d ed. (New York: Norton,
1993) at 151 [hereinafter Storm Centre].
27. Ibid. at 323.
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write a separate opinion. 8 At the very least, every reduction in the number
of judges signing on to a majority judgment reduces the clarity of its
impact on the lower courts and suggests unresolved dimensions of the
central issue that will be targeted in future litigation, the more so if it turns
a majority decision into a plurality decision.29 At the most, in a divided
Court a single judge changing sides because critical points are
inappropriately addressed may change the majority to the minority and
vice versa.
The third best choice, in terms of exercising power, would be writing
(or joining) a separate concurring opinion-that is, agreeing with the
outcome of the case but disagreeing with the reasons, at least to the extent
of suggesting that those reasons are incomplete, imperfect or misleading.
In such a position, a judge is still contributing her vote to the desired
outcome, which is the crudest but by no means an insignificant measure
of judicial power. On occasion-for example, when there is a plurality
vote, meaning that no single outcome-plus-reasons can draw the signatures
of a majority of the panel-it may be the separate concurrence itself that
determines which of a pair of balanced blocs of votes becomes the
decision of the court and which becomes a dissent.3" However, except in
the most exceptional circumstances, a separate concurrence (even if it
draws the signature of one or more other judges) cannot have the same
impact on the evolution of judicial doctrine as the majority (or plurality)
decision; and any impact that it enjoys comes at the expense of what
would otherwise be a more clear-cut and decisive set of reasons from the
majority.3' Ultimately, a separate concurrence signals that the judge
could not persuade a majority of her colleagues to sign on to her reasons,
28. For example: to keep his unanimous court in Brown v. Bd. of Education, Warren had to
agree to use the word "desegregation" rather than "integration" and to include the now
infamous phrase "with all deliberate speed." See Storm Centre, supra note 26 at 361.
29. For example: writing of the possibility that Brennan might reduce the majority by writing
separately, Schwartz reports that Warren "did not want an opinion as important as Miranda to
be diluted by any concurrence, even though it was intended to stress its author's support for the
opinion of the Court." Decision, supra note 11 at 109.
30. Far from a hypothetical situation. See, e.g., R v. Bain, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91; CN v. Norsk
Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021; Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (L.R.B.), [1993]
3 S.C.R. 327; R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701; Canada Inc. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1994] 2 S.C.R.
339; and Hickman Motors Ltd. v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 336.
31. The proposition that (other things being equal) unanimous decisions have the greatest
impact on lower courts and other actors is widely accepted in the judicial impact literature: see,
e.g., T. Becker& M. Feeley, eds., The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions: Empirical Studies,
2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); and B.C. Canon, "Courts and Policy:
Compliance, Implementation and Impact" in J. Gates & C.A. Johnson, eds., The American
Courts: A Critical Assessment (Washington: CQ Press, 1991) 435. However, I note that this
has been questioned in some of the more recent research; see J.F. Spriggs, "Explaining Federal
Bureaucratic Compliance with Supreme Court Opinions" (1997) 50 Pol. Res. Q. 567 at 580.
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even while she remained unpersuaded herself that she should put aside
her objections and sign with the majority.
The least attractive alternative, and the bottom of the scale of judicial
power, is to write (or tojoin) a dissent-rejecting not only the reasons, but
also the outcome, supported by the majority. To be sure, every Supreme
Court justice dissents some of the time, and some of those dissents can
themselves become the seeds of future majority decisions.3 2 If enough
judges dissent (or, better yet, sign on to the same dissent), they highlight
an issue that litigants might usefully revisit. However, the action of
dissenting clearly signals that in the immediate case thejudge is "off side"
from the majority, unable to persuade enough of her colleagues which
way the case should go let alone what sequence of legal reasoning
supports it.
I would submit that most dissents have little impact on the course of the
law; there are spectacular exceptions (many of them over Laskin's
signature), but they are far from typical. When lower courts or the
Supreme Court itself cite earlier cases to explain immediate outcomes, it
is overwhelmingly (about 90% of the time) decisions that they cite rather
than dissents or separate concurrences-and this frequency falls still
lower if we exclude those occasions when a judge cites her own prior
dissent or concurrence.33 A judge who never dissents may well be (as
Edelman and Chen suggest) something of a "judicial Milquetoast" more
likely to compete for Currie's or Easterbrook's "most insignificant" list
than for a position in the judicial pantheon; but nonetheless a judge who
often dissents, especially if she usually dissents alone, is unlikely to leave
many discernible footprints on the jurisprudential beach.
This "hierarchy of impact," from the heights of writing judgments for
a unanimous court to the depths of solitary dissent, provides the logical
basis for an empirical investigation of judicial power. To begin, Table 1
indicates for eachjudge on the Court how frequently they signed on to the
decision of the Court (plurality, majority or unanimous) and how often
they delivered that decision, both expressed as a percentage of total panel
appearances. Note that this excludes not only dissents but also separate
concurrences, the two occurring at almost identical rates. The right-hand
column of Table I recalculates this information for the 332 decisions that
were delivered by "divided" (that is to say, non-unanimous) courts.
Justices Wilson and Stevenson are both included in Table 1, but will be
32. See, e.g., DE. Lively, Foreshadows ofthe Law: Supreme Court Dissents and Constitutional
Development (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992).
33. See, e.g., P.J. McCormick, "The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-up
Citation on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 453.
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omitted from all subsequent tables because their total numbers of
appearances are obviously too low to permit fair comparison with the rest
of the Court. However, their numbers will continue to be included in the
all-court figures.
Table 1: Frequency of vote with majority & delivered decision, by judge
Reported Supreme Court Decisions 1990-1997
All appearances Divided courts
Judges Total With maj Del With maj Del
Lamer 470 84.5% 34.5% 68.7% 27.9%
Wilson 22 63.6% 22.8% 50.0% 13.4%
La Forest 602 83.2% 14.1% 65.3% 12.5%
L'Heureux-Dub6 588 70.6% 8.2% 40.8% 7.9%
Sopinka 667 84.4% 20.8% 66.0% 17.7%
Cory 648 89.8% 14.2% 77.9% 20.1%
Gonthier 650 86.3% 8.2% 69.7% 6.1%
McLachlin 640 76.3% 8.9% 47.2% 12.5%
Stevenson 92 82.6% 10.9% 55.6% 5.6%
lacobucci 612 90.2% 12.3% 77.4% 11.7%
Major 422 85.1% 7.1% 68.3% 7.5%
All judges 83.3% 13.9% 64.1% 13.7%
The most obvious feature of the all-appearance column is the frequency
of agreement on the Court. On average, a judge of the Supreme Court of
Canada writes or signs on to the decision of the Court six times in every
seven appearances. The range is rather narrow, from the low figure for
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 (who signs on to the majority's outcome-plus-
reasons about 70% of the time) to the high figure for Justice Iacobucci
(who does so more than 90% of the time). But these figures simply reflect
the fact that most of the Court's decisions are unanimous: just over 57%
during these the first seven years of the Lamer Court. The right-hand
column, which "zooms in" on the 43% of the Court's decisions which are
non-unanimous, is therefore a better indication of the relative (as opposed
to absolute) frequency with which the individual judges join with or
separate themselves from the rest of the Court. On this crude but not
insignificant measure (since achieving desired outcomes and giving or
endorsing the authoritative reasons for them is no small dimension of
power), two very simple conclusions can be stated. First, the more junior
members of the Court (McLachlin aside) tend to join the decision of the
Court more often (that is, to dissent or to concur separately less often) than
the more senior members. And second, the senior members of the Court
(L'Heureux-Dub6 excepted) tend to write more majority decisions than
the junior members. No major surprises here.
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Table 2: Participation Score & Index, by judge
Reported Supreme Court Decisions 1990-1997
Judge Delivered All cases Divided cases
decision34  Score Index Score Index
Lamer 41.2% 2.31 1.56 1.57 1.40
La Forest 20.2% 1.47 1.01 1.14 1.01
L'Heureux-Dub6 19.5% 1.12 0.76 0.77 0.68
Sopinka 26.5% 1.75 1.20 1.25 1.11
Cory 25.0% 1.18 1.06 1.42 1.26
Gonthier 9.0% 1.18 0.85 0.95 0.85
McLachlin 26.3% 1.18 0.82 0.96 0.86
lacobucci 14.9% 1.18 0.98 1.16 1.03
Major 11.3% 1.18 0.81 0.96 0.85
All Judges 20.5% 1.46 1.00 1.12 1.00
This fairly straightforward counting can be used to generate some
more useful indicators ofjudicial power. For one thing, the extreme right-
hand row of the table (in what percentage of divided panel appearances
did thejudge deliver the decisions of the Court) is actually a combination
of two different variables: first, how often does the judge find herself on
the "winning" side when the Court divides; and second, how often when
the judge finds herself among the winners does she become the one to
deliver the reasons. This latter figure (shown in Table 2) does carry some
suggestion of relative judicial power, the more so when it departs from
what we might otherwise expect-that is to say, from a fairly steady
gradation reflecting simple seniority. On this indicator, La Forest and
L'Heureux-Dub6 fare unexpectedly poorly (given their seniority) while
McLachlin performs strikingly well (although this is offset by the
frequency with which she finds herself outside the deciding coalition).
Seniority, it would appear, is not as good a power predictor as might have
been anticipated.
Pushing further, we can turn the number count in the data base into a
"Power Score" based on the hierarchy ofjudicial power already suggested.
Since the most common degree of power is that wielded by a judge who
votes for an outcome andjoins the set of reasons explaining it, I will treat
this as the "normal" condition and give it a score of "1.0". A separate
concurrence (written or joined) also indicates the attainment of a desired
outcome, but no direct participation in the reasons; it therefore earns a
score of "0.5". A dissent (written or joined) fails on both measures, and
therefore receives a score of "0".
34. As a percentage of those times each judge joined the majority of a divided court.
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Writing the decision of the Court should receive a higher score than
simply signing on to that decision (even assuming a collegial court in
which the writer sincerely attempts to accommodate the concerns of
coalition partners who are not constrained by any formal or informal
norms from forcefully articulating those concerns). The problem is
determining how much additional weighting to give it. I would suggest
that the writer can be thought of as having an influence equal to that of all
her coalition partners combined. Sometimes it will be much more than
this (if the rest of the panel is quiescent or yields to the writer's persuasion
or particular expertise), and sometimes it will be much less than this (if
other members of the deciding coalition continually respond to circulated
drafts by firmly suggesting substantial changes), but I would still suggest
this as a crude but plausible rule of thumb for quantifying the unquantifiable.
Ultimately, it implies a measure of how often each judge can get how
many of her colleagues to sign on to her reasons for judgment.
For all decisions of the Court, the average size of the majority is 5.86,
so for the all-decision calculations, delivering the decision will carry a
score of 4.86 (that is, 5.86 for the total size of the deciding coalition, less
I for the person doing the writing). For divided decisions of the Court, the
average size of the majority is 4.88, so for those calculations delivering
the decision will carry a score of 3.88. But the "score" for all judges
combined is 1.46 for total appearances, 1.12 for divided court appearances;
to make the comparisons more clearly, this "Power Score" is turned to a
"Power Index" by showing it as a ratio to the all-judge score.
On all the measures in Table 2, Lamer clearly stands out as the leader
of the Court. This is hardly surprising-at least since the Cartwright
Court, this pattern of dominance by the Chief Justice has clearly
characterized the Supreme Court of Canada, 35 and Table 2 is simply a way
of emphasizing some of the dimensions along which this leadership is
displayed. However, the other members of the Court who score well
above average are Sopinka (especially for total appearances) and Cory
(especially for divided court appearances). La Forest does not in any way
stand out; his numbers are very close to the overall average, and almost
indistinguishable from those of the much morejuniorlacobucci. Sopinka' s
scores are slightly higher. Indeed, seniority correlates very poorly with
the "power index," especially when the focus is on divided decisions. For
those cases, the second most "powerful" judge is the fifth most senior, and
the least "powerful" judge is the third most senior-and this despite the
35. P.J. McCormick, "Assessing Leadership on the Supreme Court of Canada: Towards a
Typology of Chief Justice Performance" (1993) 4 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 409.
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fact that I have heavily weighted the score for delivering the decisions of
the Court, a part of the process in which seniority is demonstrably a
significant factor.36
Table 3: Assessment of relative power (first approximation)
Judges of the Lamer Court 1990-1997
Voted with I Delivered Delivered when T
Majority Decision with majority "Power Index"
Judge All Divided All Divided Divided All Divided
Lamer 6th 4th 1 st 1st 1st 1st 1 st
La Forest 7th 7th 3rd 4th 5th 4th 5th
L'Heureux-
Dub6 9th 8th 7th 7th 6th 9th 9th
Sopinka 5th 6th 2nd 3rd 2nd 2nd 3rd
Cory 2nd 1st 4th 2nd 4th 3rd 2nd
Gonthier 3rd 3rd 8th 9th 9th 6th 8th
McLachlin 8th 9th 6th 5th 3rd 7th 7th
lacobucci 1st 2nd 5th 6th 7th 5th 4th
Major 4th 5th 9th 8th 8th 8th 6th
Table 3 pulls together from this discussion the seven crude measures
37
of judicial power that have been derived from the hierarchy of judicial
power suggested at the outset, turning each into a first-through-ninth
ranking of the nine 38 members of the Court. Since the actual delivery of
decisions for the Court looms so large among the indicators, we might
think of this as a concept of power organized around outcome-directing
and decision-writing leadership, and treat it as the first of several
dimensions of judicial power to be examined. On these measures, if there
is a "most dangerous" justice to be found on the table, it is clearly
Lamer-Sopinka and Cory are in the race but well back. And what of
La Forest? Fairly consistently across the seven columns, he appears to
rank in the middle third of the Court, well off the pace set by Cory and
Sopinka and especially Lamer. To the extent that these measures can be
taken as indicative, La Forest is not particularly powerful and therefore
not particularly dangerous, and his departure is news, but not major news.
36. P.J. McCormick, "Judicial Career Pattems and the Delivery of Reasons for Judgment in
the Supreme Court of Canada, 1949-1993" (1994) 5 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 499.
37. With the added methodological complication that the fourth column is really based on the
simple product of the figures that generated the third and fifth columns.
38. That is: excluding Wilson and Stevenson, on the ground that their much more limited
numbers prevent fair comparison.
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II. Judicial Power: The Structure of Supreme Court Coalitions
But this is only part of the story-and potentially a misleading part,
because aggregated figures can tell a distorted story. More specifically:
taken at their crudest, the figures from Table 1 strongly suggest that the
most typical five-judge majority of a divided Supreme Court of Canada
comprises Lamer, Cory, Gonthier, Iacobucci and Major, the only five of
the court's members who find themselves signing on to the court's
decisions in more than two thirds of the divided decisions for which they
sit-and table 2 suggests that Lamer would probably write the decision.
In fact, there has never been a single 5-4 or 5-2 decision by the Supreme
Court of Canada which brought these five together as the deciding bloc
(and there were only four 6-3 decisions which included all five of them).
This suggests that the aggregate figures are only a first step. In this
section, I will try to give a better account of a complex picture by
unravelling the structure of winning coalitions within the Supreme Court;
and this will lead (by way of Edelman and Chen's "most dangerous
justice" methodology) to a second and complementary dimension of
judicial power. If the first dimension looks at and compares the judges as
individuals, this second dimension reflects the fact that their power can
only be effective to the extent that the judges combine into more or less
stable coalitions. Judicial power on a panel court has to do with groups as
well as individuals.
This approach means focusing on the non-unanimous decisions of the
Court. When the Court fragments between two or more preferred ways of
resolving a particular case (that is, two or more sets of outcome-plus-
reasons), it is possible to see which judges tend to agree with each other
more readily and more often, presumably because of shared sets of legal
values and priorities. This has a double advantage: first, by excluding the
unanimous cases it focuses on those cases which provoked division on the
Court, exaggerating the absolute levels of disagreement so as better to
highlight the relative levels of disagreement. Second, it excludes the
rather substantial number of decisions which contain only formulaic
single paragraphs-the usual phrase is "for the reasons given in the Court
below." This narrowing of the data base avoids the problem (implicit in
any simple counting procedure) of diluting the subset of important cases
with the admixture of large numbers of routine cases.
For my purposes, I should note, the successful coalition does not
include those judges who write orjoin a separate concurrence-that is to
say, those who agree on the outcome but present an alternative set of
reasons. The same logic is used by the Harvard Law Review's annual
survey of the Supreme Court, which similarly refuses to "treat two
Justices as having agreed if they did notjoin the same opinion, even if they
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agreed in the result of the case and wrote separate opinions revealing very
little philosophical disagreement."39 There is some suggestion in the
American literature that we should push the argument a step further, and
include in a single category not only those who dissent on the outcome but
also those who agree with the outcome but dissent on the reasons-that
is to say, those who wrote separate concurrences.4 °
Of the successful coalitions, the most transparently important and
powerful are those which include five judges. This is the smallest number
that must always prevail, even on a nine-judge panel, and therefore the
smallest group capable of establishing a line of precedent in a particular
area of the law that cannot be eroded or modified without their
cooperation.4 There will be more than one such coalition, of course,
because there is no reason to think that there is only a single dimension
along which to rank thejudges, and different issues will suggest different
continua-not just coalitions of different sizes, but coalitions including
allies on one issue who were opponents on another and vice versa. But not
all theoretically possible combinations will be actually existing
combinations, and it is those coalitions that make the transition from
theoretical possibility to concrete reality that I am looking for, especially
those which do so the most often.
Over the seven years, sixty-eight cases were decided by five judge
coalitions (including in this list 5-2 decisions as will as the minimum
5-4). At first glance this number seems rather small; it works out to just
under ten five-judge majorities per year, where the comparable figure for
the U.S. Supreme Court is between sixteen and twenty.42 One obvious
explanation is the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court uses nine-judge panels
almost exclusively, while the Supreme Court of Canada uses a more
flexible mix of nine- and seven- and five-judge panels. By definition, a
five-judge panel cannot yield a divided decision with a five-judge
winning coalition, and many seven-judge panels will also fall short of the
five-member coalition threshold when they split 4-3. Another explanation
may be that the Supreme Court of Canada simply divides less often, partly
39. "The Supreme Court, 1995 Term Leading Cases" (1996) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 135 at 369.
40. K.M. Stack, "The Practice of Dissent in the [United States] Supreme Court" (1996) 105
Yale L.J. 2235. See also A. Scalia, "The Dissenting Opinion" (1994) J. Supreme Court
Hist. 33.
41. Although I will argue below, departing from Edelman and Chen on this question, that it
is a mistake to assume that this means that we can or should consider only five judge coalitions,
especially in light of Supreme Court of Canada practices with regard to panel sizes.
42. "Most Dangerous Justice," supra note 2 at 70-1.
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because its case-screening process43 lets through a significant number of
cases that are routine, and hence disposed of briefly and unanimously.
Mathematically, there are 126 possible five-judge coalitions (factorial
nine divided by factorial five and factorial four); thirty-five of these
actually occurred at least once over the seven years, excluding those that
included either Wilson or Stevenson. But a combination that occurs only
once in seven years is not much of a coalition, so rather than produce an
eye-numbing list spilling beyond an entire page I will limit my concern
to those combinations that occurred at least three times in seven years-
that is to say, roughly once every other year. There were six such
combinations:
Lamer, Sopinka, Cory, Jacobucci, Major [12]
La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, Cory, Gonthier, lacobucci [5]
La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, Cory, Gonthier, McLachlin [4]
L'Heureux-Dub, Sopinka, Cory, Gonthier, lacobucci [4]
Lamer, Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, lacobucci [3]
Sopinka, Cory, Gonthier, lacobucci, Major [3]
What leaps off the page in this listing is the pre-eminence of the
grouping of Lamer, Sopinka, Cory, lacobucci and Major. When the court
divides, no five-judge grouping prevails even half so often as this
particular combination; and on almost as many occasions (ten as against
twelve), a five-judge divided-court majority can be formed from four of
these judges plus a single outsider (Gonthier on seven occasions,
McLachlin on three). These numbers are not enormous, given that 68
decisions of divided courts were rendered by five-judge coalitions, but
the significant thing is that no other competing coalition was remotely as
successful.
There were another 30 decisions of divided courts' that were decided
by six-judge coalitions, and although these were decided by fifteen
different combinations ofjudges (of the logically possible 84), only three
occurred as often as three times over the seven-year span. These three
were:
Lamer, Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, lacobucci, Major [5]
Lamer, Sopinka, Cory, Gonthier, lacobucci, Major [5]
Lamer, La Forest, Sopinka, Cory, lacobucci, Major [3]
43. There still remain some cases (such as appeals from decisions in criminal matters
involving a dissent on a matter of law in the provincial court of appeal) that must be heard as
a matter of right by the Supreme Court of Canada, regardless of whether or not they think the
case raises a question of national importance.
44. Omitting for present purposes those that divided as lopsidedly as 6-1.
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It is striking that all three of these combinations include the five-judge
coalition identified above, reinforcing the impression that this group
constitutes the solid core of the Lamer Court.
If the Court always sat in nine-judge panels, then this would be the end
of the story-any point of view unable to recruit and sustain a set of at
least five judges could not prevail in the long run, and even in the short
run its successes would be few. True, sometimes a four-judge grouping
can prevail should the other five split themselves between iwo mutually
exclusive alternatives 45-plurality judgments will carry the day and set
the legal doctrine if no majority judgment can be formed. However, such
outcomes are both provocative and vulnerable-provocative because
they mean that a minority of judges is setting the tone of the Court on
important issues,46 and vulnerable because the subsequent coalescence of
a majority can quickly reverse its apparent accomplishments. In a
Supreme Court guided by a strong preference for full panels, five is the
magic number (six is better, although logically a luxury), and this is the
logic that drives the analysis in Edelman and Chen.47
But the Supreme Court of Canada is not such a Court. Full nine-judge
panels were used for only 31% of reported panel decisions over the seven
year period, more frequently than five-judge panels (27%) but less so than
seven judge panels (42%). The Court attempts to practice a logical triage,
treating panels of seven as the norm with larger panels for the most critical
cases and five judge panels for the ones that are expected to be of lesser
importance. However, this triage is necessarily imperfect-dozens of
nine-judge panels hand down the formulaic dismissals that consume only
a page or two in the Supreme Court Reports, while some highly visible
and important decisions (such as Thomson Newspapers v. Canada)48
have been delivered by five-judge panels.
This practice of varying panel sizes, which so sharply differentiates the
Supreme Court of Canada from its American counterpart, strongly
suggests that we should broaden the search for viable and potentially
decisive coalitions. When seven-judge panels are so common, four-judge
coalitions are not necessarily locked in perpetual frustration (barring the
fortuitous occasion of a plurality judgment), but can still enjoy their share
45. Just as a political party that never gains much more or much less than 40% of the vote can
regularly win elections and form a government, so long as the remaining 60% cooperates by
dividing itself fairly evenly between two or more alternatives. This is, of course, how the
Liberals swept Ontario in the 1997 federal general election.
46. See, e.g., J.F. Davis & W.L. Reynolds, "Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the
[United States] Supreme Court" (1974) Duke L.J. 59.
47. "The Most Dangerous Justice," supra note 2; "Sultans of Swing," supra note 2.
48. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425.
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of successes. And when five-judge panels hear one-quarter of all the
cases, three-judge coalitions can also form for effective results. This
means that voting patterns on smaller panels are equally useful as a
hunting ground for effective and enduring coalitions.
There were 82 cases in which four-judge coalitions ofjudges delivered
the majority or plurality decision of the Court. Logically, there are 126
different ways (factorial nine divided by factorial four and factorial five)
in which four-judge groups can be built from a nine-judge court; forty-
seven of them occurred in practice (omitting groups that included Wilson
or Stevenson), but only six of them as often as three times over the seven-
year period. These six were:
La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier, McLachlin [5]
La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, Cory, lacobucci [3]
La Forest, Sopinka, Iacobucci, Major [3]
Lamer, Sopinka, Cory, lacobucci [3]
Lamer, Sopinka, Cory, Major [3]
Sopinka, Cory, Iacobucci, Major [3]
It is striking that the most frequently successful of the four-judge
coalitions includes precisely those four members of the Court who are
excluded by the five-judge "core" identified above, and that another three
of these four-judge blocs are simple subsets of the same five-judge core.
This is further evidence that this particular cleavage may indeed be the
single most important part of the way the Court divides for its most critical
decision making.
On a further sixty occasions, the decision of the Court was delivered
by a three-judge combination; of the 84 logically possible combinations,
29 actually occurred and six occurred three or more times over the seven
years. They were:
La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier [9]
L'Heureux-Dub6, Cory, McLachlin [4]
Lamer, Cory, Gonthier [4]
Lamer, Sopinka, Major [3]
La Forest, Gonthier, McLachlin [3]
L'Heureux-Dub6, Cory, lacobucci [3]
By far the most frequent of the three-judge combinations-indeed, the
second most common coalition of any size to deliver decisions for a
divided court-is drawn from the four-judge group of outsiders, and
another such combination appears second from bottom on the list.
To try to draw some discursive general conclusions from these lists:
the list of successful five-judge coalitions on the nine-judge Court is
clearly led by the Lamer-Sopinka-Cory-lacobucci-Major group, which I
will call the "core group"; no other coalition of whatever size has
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delivered as many divided court decisions. This same group also explains
the thirteen decisions of the only three six-judge combinations to have
occurred as often as three times; four-judge combinations drawn from
these five combine for a further twelve decisions; and three-judge sub-
combinations for another ten. In all, the core group in its various
combinations and recombinations explains a total of 47 of the 24049
divided court decisions, more than any other comparable group. Lamer
is clearly the leading spokespersotn, Raving dell-l-vere 1711 of thei.r
decisions, compared with 9'/2 for Sopinka and 9 for Cory.5"
The second identifiable group is the one formed by La Forest,
L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier and McLachlin, whom I will label "the
outsiders." This group accounts for a total of eighteen decision-delivering
combinations of divided courts-five as a four-judge group and thirteen
others as "contained" three-judge groups. This is quite a surprising total
considering that an alternative credible four-judge group (say, Lamer,
Sopinka, Iacobucci, Major) accounts for only seven; and this larger
number reinforces their appearance as a coherent group. The leading
spokesman for "the outsiders" is clearly La Forest, writing 10'/2 of their
eighteen decisions compared to only five for L' Heureux-Dub6. 51 Between
them, the "core" and the "outsiders" as distinct and mutually exclusive
groupings account for only 65 of the 240 divided court decisions,
reflecting the extent to which the Court is driven by shifting coalitions
rather than by permanently polarized factions. But if this observation
warns us away from thinking that the division between the Lamer group
and the La Forest group is the only major dynamic on the Court, it is still
the case that no other 5/4 division can account for anywhere near as many,
and therefore that this cleavage is the most important one that emerges
from a consideration of enduring coalition patterns.
There is something even more remarkable about the "outsiders" and
that is the fact that they also form part of a five-judge group that closely
rivals "the core" for their degree of success on divided courts. The
outsiders alone account for 18 decisions-but the outsiders plus Cory
account for a total of 39, almost as many as "the core" itself. This wider
grouping, that we might call "the alternative core," explains the results of
49. This number differs from the 332 divided court decisions mentioned in the discussion of
table I because it excludes all 6-1,7-2 and 8-1 decisions, as well as the nine cases in which the
"winning" side was so fragmented as not to have even three judges combine for a decision of
the court.
50. The two half-decisions refer to the jointly authored majority decision by Lamer and
Sopinka in A.(L.L.) v. B.(A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536.
51. The half-decision is the one co-authored by La Forest and McLachlin in B.G. Checo v.
B.C. Hydro, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 12.
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four five-judge majorities, eleven four-judge majorities, and twenty-four
three-judge majorities. No other defection from "the core" carries such as
immediate practical impact-where the outsiders plus Cory alone means
an additional 21 majorities, the outsiders plus Iacobucci alone (the logical
next choice) means only an additional seven majorities. Cory's pivotal
position in the Court is strongly hinted at by the fact that he is the only
judge to appear in all six of the six most successful five-judge combinations.
However, even if Cory's adhesion so dramatically increases their success
rate as to turn "the outsiders" into "the alternative core," La Forest still
remains the intellectual leader of this broader grouping as well, writing
191/2 of their 39 decisions.
This investigation of the coalition structure of the divided court
suggests a more subtle modification of the preliminary results. If the first
set of indicators looked at outcome-directing and decision-delivering
leadership as an element ofjudicial power, this second approach looks at
the forming of stable coalitions as an additional element. And this
involves a dimension of paradox: if the first approach emphasizes
"leadership as power," this second implies that for many-even most-
of the members of the most stable coalitions, power is found in
"followership." On this second coalitional look at power, Lamer again
stands out: he is the clear leader of the largest consistent coalition-the
"core"-to emerge when the Court divides on critical issues, and he
demonstrates this leadership by writing some 40% of their decisions.
La Forest is the clear leader of a second group, this leadership remaining
whether we limit it to "the outsiders" or expand it to "the alternative core."
However, the person whose role is the most distinctive is Cory. He
occupies an important swing position, his participation accounting for
fully 85% of the core's majorities and also for 54% of the alternative
core's majorities. The dynamics linking these three individual actors are
an important part of the Supreme Court drama in those cases that bring
out the divisions within the Court. Because La Forest is one of the three
his departure is an important event that will change the Court; but on this
analysis, the title of the "most dangerous justice" clearly and
unambiguously belongs to Cory.
III. Judicial Power: The "Deep Structure" of
Supreme Court Coalitions
This analysis started by considering some measures of effective judicial
power that considered the writing and voting activity of each judge more
or less in isolation. The limitations of this approach acknowledged, the
attempt was then made to examine the most frequently successful
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coalitions with the clear implication that the members of the most
successful coalitions exercise the most effective power. One possibility,
assuming a rigidly polarized court, was that there would be a stable
coalition of "winners" and a slightly smaller stable coalition of "losers,"
the former presumably having (and more or less equally sharing) almost
all the power and the others having (and again more or less equally
sharing) almost no power. In fact, the reality was a little more complex:
there were two groups of equal size, each prevailing with about the same
frequency, and with a single member of the Court constituting the overlap
between them. Again, crudely, it looks as if I am suggesting that each of
these two groups has roughly equal power, that each of the members
within each group has roughly equal power, and therefore that Cory, the
only person to be a member of both groups on a stable basis, has twice as
much power as anyone else.
Edelman and Chen argue that this is much too casual a view, and that
not even the individual figures from the first section are enough to offset
its inappropriate influence-levelling implications. They start their analysis
from the same sort of calculation that appears above-that is, identifying
the five-judge coalitions that prevail in a divided court. But they deny that
every member of the coalition has an equal share of the coalition's voting
power, and they also deny that the greatest share necessarily belongs to
the member of the coalition who is doing most of the writing (although
they do consider this aspect as something of a potential "tie-breaker"
between comparably "dangerous" justices). Instead, they argue that the
most powerful member of each coalition is the member who is the most
likely to defect-"[t]he most dangerous Justices are those who are most
able-and willing-to switch their votes on incremental but decisive
legal propositions."52 And the way to identify this factor is not by
vanishing into the abstractions of game-theoretic analyses, where every
five judge combination is equally likely, but by examining the actual
voting behaviour of thejudges when push comes to shove at these critical
5/4 interfaces. Ajudge demonstrates her ability and willingness to switch
by actually having switched-by being part of more actual five-judge
coalitions than her colleagues, and especially more than her colleagues in
the immediate five-judge coalition she is attempting to influence. Edelman
and Chen explicitly note that the strategy of maximizing power through
"flexible voting" is an alternative to the more visible power of opinion
leadership.53 Since the writing and assigning of opinions is generally
52. "The Most Dangerous Justice," supra note 2 at 96.
53. Ibid. at 98.
116 Dalhousie Law Journal
linked to seniority, it follows that the higher scores for flexible voting tend
to go to the more junior members of the Court-in 1994 and 1995, they
identify Ginsburg and Kennedy rather than more obvious judicial
heavyweights like Rehnquist and O'Connor and Scalia.
Let me make it clear what I have in mind when I talk about "flexible"
voting. I am not of course suggesting that ajudge would threaten to vote,
or actually vote, against an appeal she thought should succeed simply in
order to be "flexible" or to gain some concession or to increase her
leverage. For one thing: on my analysis, as well as that of Edelman and
Chen, separate concurrences are "outside" the winning coalition rather
than part of it, so the "vote switching" involved may simply be a
preference between two different sets of reasons for the same outcome.
Or a judge may be choosing between one side that will allow an appeal
while stating the central legal principle in a way she finds objectionable,
while the other side will dismiss the appeal but may be capable of being
persuaded to do so on much narrower terms, leaving the further clarification
of the basic principle for the future.54 Especially at the appellate level,
there is much more to most cases than a simple "yes" or "no," and there
is therefore much more that judges have to take into consideration, and
much more that they can argue and disagree and negotiate about, than the
simple act of voting for or against an appeal. If we accept that the reasons
are more important than the outcome-and I think this proposition should
border on the self-evident-then it is perfectly legitimate for a justice
sometimes to prefer working within the majority to get the best possible
wording rather than sitting with her arms righteously folded in separate
concurrence or even in dissent. As Wahlbeck, Spriggs and Maltzman
demonstrate for the United States Supreme Court, gaining the necessary
signatures for a majority decision is a process of negotiation, compromise
and accommodation.
5
54. For an extended discussion of the desirability of this second choice, see C.R. Sunstein,
"Leaving Things Undecided" (1996) 110 Harvard L. Rev. 4.
55. P.J. Wahlbeck, J.F. Spriggs II, & F. Maltzman, "Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and
Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court" (1998) 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 294.
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It is also an important element of Edelman and Chen's analysis that it
makes no difference how often each five-judge coalition actually occurs.
If coalition A occurs ten times and coalition B only three times,56 both
have proved themselves to be examples of viable coalitions. There has
been a practical demonstration that there are some issues on which these
five judges will join ranks, and they confirm this for us by doing it again.
Of course, it will tend to be the case that a small sub-set of the actual
coaiioIsI will appear aiud IldlvCl  L Wua i uIIOlLII Ulall LIlCuLIcl , adu Ulla
is the most important thing for most court watchers. For Edelman and
Chen, however, the important thing is to develop an empirically based
assessment of which judge within the more frequently dominant group is
the most able and therefore the most likely to defect, and for this it is the
number of demonstrably effective coalitions that is more important than
the relative frequency of specific coalitions. To venture into metaphor:
they want only to demonstrate that a particular road exists, not caring
whether the road is paved or whether it is carrying much traffic.
As in the previous section, it makes the most sense to begin by
restricting the discussion to five-judge coalitions in decided cases-the
smallest possible combination that can prevail against all comers-
which gives us the six different coalitions previously listed. We then
simply count the number of times that each individual judge appears on
this six-coalition list, and this is the number that appears in Table 4.
(Again, it does not matter to Edelman and Chen' s methodology that some
coalitions occur more often than others. Taking this into account just
sends us back to the "with majority" count from the first stage of the
analysis.) But this number in turn can be converted to an index by
comparing it to the behaviour of the notional average justice. There are
thirty "slots" in the six five-judge coalitions, so the average judge should
be in one-ninth of them-awkwardly not a whole number, this comes to
3 1/3. The actual coalition frequency of each justice can then be compared
to (divided by) this average, and then multiplied by 100 to generate a
score. The results are shown in Table 4.
56. Edleman & Chen, of course, would not say "only three times" they would say "only once."
But their paper is analyzing voting power for single terms, not for the seven-year sweep of this
article, and I will therefore retain my "at least three" cut-off to keep the numbers manageable.
They also argue, however, that the reason for taking even single examples so seriously is the
fact that no single year provides a full and balanced range of all the issues and principles that
could come before the Court; over a period of seven years, it seems more defensible to argue
that a five-judge combination that does not even occur every second year is too ephemeral to
count.
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Table 4: Coalition Frequency and "Power Voting" Score












The scores for each judge are highly suggestive, especially when read
in conjunction with the broad coalition patterns suggested in the previous
section. Lamer and La Forest are the senior members and the principal
spokespersons (decision deliverers) for the "core" group and the
"alternative core" respectively, but the price they pay for this prominence
is a relative inflexibility in terms of coalition shifting: each of them
appears in only two of the six prominent five-judge coalitions. The table
suggests that each has a most dependable coalition partner as well-
Major for Lamer, McLachlin for La Forest-who similarly appear in only
two of the six most frequently successful five-judge coalitions; L'Heureux-
Dub6 is only one notch more flexible than McLachlin. Cory' s appearance
in all six of the five-judge groupings gives him a score of 180, almost
twice the score of the notional average judge, closely followed by
Iacobucci (five of the six combinations) with 150; Sopinka and Gonthier,
with four coalition appearances each, have scores slightly above the
average.
Nonetheless, for the reasons already argued above, the exclusive
consideration of five-judge majorities is less justified in the Canadian
context than it is in the American. Most panels have fewer than the full
set of nine judges, and one in every four has only five; this means that
three- and four-judge coalitions are effective not just on those rare
occasions when a fragmented court fails to deliver a majority judgment,
but on a far more regular basis. A complete look at the coalitional "deep
structure" of the Lamer court should therefore include all the successful
and frequent coalitions listed in the previous section-not just the six
five-judge combinations, but also the six four-judge combinations, the
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six three-judge combinations and (for good measure) the three six-judge
combinations. Again, the logic is to count the number of times that each
individual judge appears on this extended list, and these totals are shown
in Table 5. Again, these numbers are expressed as a score-there are 90
slots on the 21 different combinations, which means that the notional
averagejudge should appear on ten of them. For direct comparability with
Table 4, each judge's score is simply the number of coalitions multiplied
by ten (the actual number of coalitions, divided by the "average judge"
number of ten, times 100).
Table 5: Coalition Frequency and "Power Voting" Score













Somewhat surprisingly, the pattern from this large set of fragmentary
coalitions differs very little from that in Table 4, the single major
difference being the lower score for Gonthier. It is still the case that
La Forest, McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 (and now Gonthier)
demonstrate low flexibility scores, which is another way of saying that
none of them takes part in decision-delivering majorities very often. On
the other flank of the Court, the relative inflexibility of Lamer and Major
shows that they run some risk of being isolated by the relative flexibility
of Sopinka and lacobucci and especially Cory. At the same time,
however, Cory's "powerful voting" (to use Edelman and Chen' s term) no
longer appears sui generis, as it did in the previous section; instead, it is
something comparable to, but slightly stronger than, that of lacobucci and
Sopinka.
However, since "powerful voting" simply is the essence of Edelman
and Chen's notion of the "most dangerous justice," this still leaves Cory
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with the strongest claim to the title-although to an extent that was not
clear from the analysis in the second section, lacobucci and Sopinka are
in the running and not far behind. And the significance of La Forest's
departure is less in his own "dangerousness" score (which is very modest)
than in the way it destabilizes the coalitions on the Court. This is
important because the "power" that flows from "powerful voting" is less
an individual attribute than a product of interactions, onejudge' s flexibility
becoming a strategic lever only if it plays off the relative stability of her
colleagues. It becomes harder to bank a shot off the wall if the wall itself
is moving.
Conclusion
The general purpose of this article was to suggest a variety of
methodological approaches that together would shed some light on the
relative degrees of power enjoyed by each of the members on the current
Supreme Court of Canada, this being provocatively labelled the search
for the "most dangerous justice." The specific purpose was to use these
power measures to develop an empirically grounded feeling for the
significance of the retirement of Justice La Forest and the death of Justice
Sopinka, and their subsequent replacement by Justices Bastarache and
Binnie.
On the basis of the first crude set of measures-relating in different
ways to the question of the relative frequency with which each justice
joins or writes the majority decision-it was suggested that Justice
La Forest ranks in the middle third of the Court with Justice Sopinka just
above him. Admittedly, none of these measures is particularly subtle, and
arguments could be adduced against any one of them as an adequate
measure of judicial power, but the consistency of the patterns across all
seven rankings was striking and at least indicative. On these measures, the
top (and therefore most powerful and "most dangerous") third of the
Court comprises Lamer (by a solid margin), Cory and Sopinka, a ranking
which is at some variance with their respective seniority. On these
measures, to be blunt, the departure of La Forest is small news rather than
big news; and the subsequent death of Sopinka is potentially more
significant.
A second approach sought to tease out the pivotal coalition structure
of the Supreme Court, by limiting the consideration to divided courts, and
emphasizing decisions by the more evenly divided courts-that is to say,
not only were unanimous decisions excluded, but also those in which the
Court divided 8-1, 7-2, and 6-1. On this basis, it was suggested that the
"core" of the Lamer court is a group comprising Lamer, Sopinka, Cory,
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lacobucci and Major; Lamer writes the bulk of the decisions for majorities
drawn from this group. A second group, emerging in its own right and not
simply as the excluded members from this five-judge core, comprised
La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier and McLachlin, with La Forest
writing most of their decisions. What was equally intriguing was the role
of Cory-if his "day job" involved being part of the Lamer-led core, he
also seemed to moonlight very successfully with the La Forest-led
outsiders, creating an "alternative core" that nvalled the Lamer group for
its degree of success in divided decisions, although La Forest still did the
bulk of the writing. On this approach, La Forest can be seen as the
principal spokesperson for one side of the essential dialogue that is being
carried on whenever the Court divides, and this makes him (with Lamer
and Cory) one of the three key players in the dynamic development of the
Court's jurisprudence. Cory may be the "most dangerous" justice, but
La Forest's departure from the Court is still very big news indeed, and
Sopinka's subsequent departure threatens to undermine the stable block
off which Cory's "flexible voting" played.
On the third approach, the frequency with which individual judges
appear on the various successful coalitions, not just the single most
successful coalition, can be used to rank them in terms of "flexibility" or
"powerful voting." On the one hand, there are the "loyalists" (Lamer and
Major on the one side, La Forest and McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub on
the other) who appear in only a small number of coalitions with a fairly
specific set of allies, and on the other there are the "opportunists" (Cory,
lacobucci and Sopinka) who appear in many coalitions embracing a wide
variety of partnerships. Gonthier appears to be an "opportunist" if
consideration is limited to five-judge coalitions, but a "loyalist" if
attention is broadened to include the full "deep structure" of successful
combinations of all sizes. But this opportunism is just another word for
the "powerful voting" which Edelman and Chen suggest as the
operationalization of the concept of the most dangerous justice, which
means that Cory again wins the title (honorable mention to Iacobucci and
Sopinka) with La Forest completely out of the running.
These are three rather different pictures, each suggesting subtle
revisions to the other two. On the first account, Lamer, Cory and Sopinka
are the three most powerful members of the Court, by virtue of being those
whose participation on a panel is the most likely to result in the writing
of, or at least in participation in, the majority decision. On the second
account, Lamer is the leader of the "core" group on the Court, La Forest
is the leader of the "alternate core," and Cory is a critically important
member of both groups, the pivotal swing voter who most often determines
which will have its way-these are the three individuals whose interaction
122 Dalhousie Law Journal
is the central story of the divided court, and we can argue whether Lamer
or Cory is "really" the most powerful. On the third account, the flexible
voting power of Cory, lacobucci and Sopinka makes them the pivotal
members of the Court, the ones who are the most demonstrably willing
and able to move from one potential coalition to the other as various issues
are addressed by the Court.
The question is not "which of these three stories is true?" All three of
them are true, in the same way that the elephant not only appeared to be
but was different things to each of the blind men (without ceasing in the
process to be an elephant). The power of writing majority decisions is not
the same thing as the power of stable coalition formation and both are
different from the power of flexible voting; to some extent these even
seem to trade off against each other. Rather, the question is how all three
of these different views help us to understand how the "late Lamer" Court
may be different from the "early Lamer" Court.
Crudely, we could diagram the voting patterns of the Lamer court
between 1990 and 1997 as follows:
Lam Maj Sop lac Cory Gon LaF McL L'H
The left-right spectrum is to be taken as purely notional (from "core" to
"outsider") without any ideological implications; and the relative positions
indicate both the pivotal central role of Cory as well as some feeling for
the frequency with which "neighbouring" judges can enter alliances in
either direction. Of course, any single diagram oversinplifies-there are
many axes along which the voting and alliance predilections of the judges
can be calculated and plotted, and notjust the relative positioning but the
notional distances between adjacentjudges might well vary from one axis
to another. However, the oversimplification notwithstanding, the diagram
provides a logical basis for thinking about the implications of La Forest's
retirement and Sopinka's death.
It is useful to compare this suggested structure with the findings from
another study that has considered voting patterns on the Court. Morton,
Russell and Riddell, for a time period (1982 to 1992) partially overlapping
the one considered here and for a narrower set of decisions (Charter
cases), came up with a general description of the Lamer Court as
characterized by "a consolidation of the dominance of the Court's grey
middle" rather than the American experience of an ideologically polarized
Court .5 However, they also identify two "wings" of the Court, the first
in the person of Lamer (for whom the numbers suggest that he "has been
57. F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, "The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms:
A Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade 1982-1992" (1996) 5 N.J.C.L. I at 39.
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less interested in or less able to continue the consensus-maker role" than
Dickson)58 and the second in the form of the female justices who have
been "the most independent in terms of their willingness to dissent"
although differences between them remain significant.59 In these general
terms, their picture is similar to my own, although I note that the levels
of bilateral agreement in their Table 1260 point to clusterings for Charter
cases somewhat different from those I have identified for all divided
decisions.
The suggested "logical structure of the Court" clearly points us to one
sense in which the departure of La Forest can have a significant impact
on the Court even when it does not involve a member of the block that has
tended to form the majority on the court. His departure has an impact
because it destabilizes the nature of, and the balance between, the major
coalitions within the Court. Over the last seven years, a major dimension
of the Court's performance on divisive issues has been a balance between
the two camps whose principal spokespersons are Lamer and La Forest.
The departure of La Forest destroys this balance, and the behaviour of his
successor will determine what sort of a balance takes its place, even while
the departure of Sopinka takes away a reliable and very articulate member
of the more frequently dominant Lamer group. Who is going to be the
other half of the argument, and how large and how strong and how united
will their "core" group be, and how will the focus of that argument-the
key issues over which the argument is most convincingly articulated and
pursued-shift with this new spokesperson?
One possibility is that one of the new judges will become a new
"outsider" while the other joins the core-in terms of the notional
diagram above, joins McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 on the "right-
hand" side (which just means the non-Lamer side) of the Court, and the
other will join Lamer & Co. on the "left-hand" side. This will retain both
the existing balance and will leave the same person acting as the pivot of
the Court, although the "outsiders" will have to acquire a new principal
voice. (On the numbers from the last seven years, L'Heureux-Dub6
would appear to be the most likely candidate, but the new leading role
does not automatically go to the understudy.) This scenario would
represent the smallest degree of change, although there would be some
significance to the fact that one team had replaced a "veteran" with a
58. Ibid. at 40.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid. at 36.
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"rookie," and the new principal voice will have her own priorities, her
own central issues, her own preferred direction and style.
A second possibility is that both of the new judges will become more
solidly loyal members of the "core" than Cory. In terms of the notional
diagram, they will join Major well over to the "left hand" side (which just
means the Lamer side) of the Court. This is a logical implication of the
"freshman effect" which often sees new members of the Court keep a low
profile and go with the majority while they find their feet. In such a
circumstance, the pivot of the Court will move to the "right" away from
Lamer, and someone else will play the role that Cory played for seven
years. In the process, the mid-point-that is to say, the issues over top of
which the most coalition shifting takes place-will also change.
A third possibility is that one or both of the new judges will enter the
competition for the pivot position. This is not an illogical or unlikely
scenario: as Edelman and Chen suggest, lack of seniority is such a
limiting factor for recent appointees that "powerful voting"-that is to
say, a flexible approach to dynamic coalition building-is often the best
strategy if they wish to play a significant role.61 Crudely put, the more
likely ajudge is to defect to other possible coalitions in any single divided
court decision, the higher the price they can demand for not defecting, and
that price can be measured in terms of a strong say in the precise wording
of the reasons for judgment, if not the writing assignment itself. If you
cannot write, then be the person the writer cannot afford to ignore. And
if there is an inverse relationship between seniority and the power to be
gained by "flexible" voting, then it makes sense not to assume that the
same individual will necessarily hold the pivot position throughout his or
her career, but will move away from it once they are sitting closer to the
centre chair than to the door.
62
This third possibility is harder to conceptualize in terms of the notional
diagram. If someone is "bumped" from a central position, where do they
"go"? However, it is also the most destabilizing of the scenarios. If the
centre three spots are to be occupied by someone as high or even higher
on the coalition flexibility ("power voting") scale than either Cory or
61. "The Most Dangerous Justice," supra note 2 at 9ff.
62. The "centre chair" is, of course, the Chief Justice, who is by definition the most senior
member of the Court. It is no longer Canadian practice that he necessarily be the longest serving
member of the Court although, as it happens, Lamer is the most senior in this sense as well. "The
door" is an American reference which may or may not be echoed in Canada, reflecting the
practice of excluding clerks and secretaries from the judicial conference, so the most junior
justice sits closest to the door to answer it should there be a knock.
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lacobucci during the early years of this decade, then a completely
different set of voting patterns-a new "core" and a new set of
"outsiders"-may well emerge. It will probably be less stable than the
one to which we have grown accustomed, and it will probably be a
different set of issues that provides the ground over which the new
coalitions organize and re-organize themselves.
The departure of La Forest and Sopinka may yet prove to be the most
important development of Lamer's chief justiceship. La Forest may not
be the "most dangerous"justice, nor yet the most "powerful"judge on any
approach or calculation, but he has nonetheless been one of the Court's
most significant players as the principal spokesman for the "outsiders."
Sopinka may not be the "most dangerous" justice either, but he was a solid
member of the dominant core and a Court leader in his own right on an
important range of issues. The departure of either of them makes a real
difference to the way that the Supreme Court operates, the way it divides
on critical issues, even the kind of law it makes. The departure of both of
them strongly suggests that we may have crossed a real watershed, and
that it may soon be appropriate to speak of a "late Lamer court" that will
be significantly different from the "early Lamer court" of the last seven
years-and even more so (given his central and pivotal position) with the
departure of Cory in the summer of 1999.
